A Horizon-Independent Regret Bound for Optimistic Hedge in General-Sum Games

arXiv:2609.22839v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Can simple learning rules keep their regret bounded in self-play? Recent work achieves constant regret bounds through modified regularization and higher-order prediction. Yet for Optimistic Hedge, arguably the most canonical method in games, the best known individual regret bound remains logarithmic. In this work, we prove that plain Optimistic Hedge with a constant step size can attain $O_{n,d}(1)$ individual regret in general-sum games with $n$ players and $d=(d_1,\ldots,d_n)$ actions, under expected loss-vector feedback. As a corollary, its time-averaged play enjoys an $O_{n,d}(1/T)$ coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) gap. Our analysis represents Optimistic Hedge as a real-analytic recurrence on a compact space, which yields an exact finite-order difference relation that eliminates horizon dependence. Our proof hinges on nonconstructive Noetherianity argument of Frisch (1967), so the $(n,d)$-dependence remains implicit.