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Depth, Not Breadth: Best-of-N Jailbreaking Beyond Surface Noise
HZ

Haoyu Zhang, Hanwen Liu, Yang Chen, Shibo Zheng, Xiangchen Guan, Zhuoxi Wang, Zijian Xiao, Xiao Luo, Yi Feng, Haowen Xu, Mohammad Zandsalimy, Shanu Sushmita

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ResearcharXiv cs.AI

Depth, Not Breadth: Best-of-N Jailbreaking Beyond Surface Noise

arXiv:2607.26639v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Best-of-N jailbreaking spends a query budget on surface variation, scrambling and recasing a request until one draw lands. We ask what a budget buys when its variance is moved into a structural channel instead, holding the search identical across both arms so the encoding is the only difference. Against SAGE, the strongest published self-check defense, best-of-N over a code-completion encoding reaches 67, 22 and 15% of behaviors on three open-weight targets, where that encoding fired once reaches at most 4.7% and the published character search at full budget at most 3.0%: 9 to 75 times the sum of the parts, with bootstrap intervals clearing both ingredients on every target. We report the operative figure beside the headline rather than the headline alone: at the actionable severity threshold those cells read 24, 8 and 1 behaviors (95% CI [13, 28], [3, 13], [0, 3]). A 2x2 holding encoding and variation apart shows the two defense families fail to different factors: a transform defense is broken by the depth of the encoding (7 -> 67 behaviors at fixed variation) and a gate by the breadth of the variation (13 -> 57 at fixed encoding). Repeated sampling also inflates apparent robustness, because an attacker who may try N times experiences the maximum over draws while safety results are reported as means: on one target SAGE blocks 99.8% of individual draws yet loses 12 behaviors to a repeat attacker where a classifier gate blocking 95.6% loses 10. Removing the target's sampling costs SAGE 59, 76, 82 and 29 points of coverage more than it costs an undefended control, against 25, -5, 8 and 2 for a defense whose verdict comes from a fixed shadow model. The design that loses is the one fusing screening and answering into a single generation, so every attacker draw redraws the safety decision as well. The prescription is architectural, not free: do not fuse screening with generation.

Original source

This story was published by arXiv cs.AI and written by Haoyu Zhang, Hanwen Liu, Yang Chen, Shibo Zheng, Xiangchen Guan, Zhuoxi Wang, Zijian Xiao, Xiao Luo, Yi Feng, Haowen Xu, Mohammad Zandsalimy, Shanu Sushmita. SyncAI.news shows a preview; the complete article is on the publisher's site.

Read the full story on arxiv.org

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