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GraphRAG-LTM: A Layered Threat Modeling Framework for Attacks on Graph Retrieval-Augmented Generation
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Yining Tang, Junyu Zhang, Haomiao Qiu, Yongchao Liu, Jiajun Zheng, Zhao Wang, Ziyue Qiao, Chao Wu

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ResearcharXiv cs.CL

GraphRAG-LTM: A Layered Threat Modeling Framework for Attacks on Graph Retrieval-Augmented Generation

arXiv:2610.19549v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Graph retrieval-augmented generation (GraphRAG) uses document-derived knowledge graphs to assemble evidence for large language model (LLM) answers. Its security depends on both the seed chunks retrieved for a query and the graph evidence assembled from them, yet attacks on this evidence path remain underexplored. We introduce GraphRAG-LTM, a Layered Threat Modeling framework that tests three nested levels of attacker access. BB Query uses ranking feedback to make query edits under a semantic-similarity constraint and demote relevant seed chunks. WB Query uses retriever gradients for the same objective. Graph-aware WB keeps the white-box adversarial query and deletes bridge triplets from the query-specific evidence graph, disrupting multi-hop evidence propagation through localized graph edits. Across datasets, retrievers, and LLM backbones, rank feedback alone reduces answer quality, gradient access strengthens query attacks, and bridge-triplet deletion further impairs supporting-fact retrieval. Further analyses show how seed retrieval and graph evidence jointly contribute to these failures.

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This story was published by arXiv cs.CL and written by Yining Tang, Junyu Zhang, Haomiao Qiu, Yongchao Liu, Jiajun Zheng, Zhao Wang, Ziyue Qiao, Chao Wu. SyncAI.news shows a preview; the complete article is on the publisher's site.

Read the full story on arxiv.org

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