Operation “A2Z”: Multilingual influence activity

This case study was originally published in OpenAI’s October 2024⁠(opens in a new window) report.

Actor

We banned a previously unreported cluster of accounts that were using our API to create comments that were then posted on X and Facebook. Many of these comments praised Azerbaijan or defended its human-rights record, but it also focused on a wide range of other topics, potentially suggesting a commercially run operation. Given the frequency with which it praised Azerbaijan and its attempt to use AI through multiple phases of the operation, we have dubbed this network “A2Z”.

Behavior

Like the Russian-language Telegram operation that we exposed in May and dubbed “Bad Grammar”, this operation used our models to enable social media commenting. It leveraged AI to manage fake social-media personas, generate bios, analyze posts and comments, draft replies in many languages, and proofread them. The responses were then posted on X or Facebook. Most of the content was in the form of short comments, but it also included stylized images. These often used the style of 1930s posters: as such, they appear designed to attract attention and engagement, rather than to deceive. However, typical posts with these stylized images only received 0–5 engagements each.

This use of AI enabled the operation to manage many social media accounts at once: we identified around 150 accounts across X and Facebook that matched this activity, with more suspected accounts. It also enabled the operation to sometimes engage in comment threads with real people on the internet. Occasionally, we observed short conversations between real people and the fake accounts, where the fakes’ replies were generated using our models.