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Yanjie Li, Xiangyu He, Xuelong Dai, Bin Xiao
· 1 min read
ResearcharXiv cs.AI
ToolFence: Fine-Grained Authorization for Secure Tool-Using LLM Agents
arXiv:2609.37196v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Tool-using LLM agents remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because trusted instructions and untrusted observations share one context, allowing malicious content to steer consequential input-filtering defenses. Multi-path consensus defenses still leave a high attack success rate because they examine content or aggregated outputs rather than authorizing effects, especially for the within-tool attack, which preserves the intended tool but manipulates its arguments. Data-Flow Control such as CaMeL provides stronger guarantees, but incurs substantial time latency that limits practical deployment. We introduce ToolFence, which compiles a typed authorization blueprint before execution, enforces it through a deterministic monitor, and when the blueprint is incomplete asks a judge to grant new capabilities rather than adjudicate each concrete call. ToolFence provides two key advantages. First, its fine-grained provenance-aware authorization enables the system to distinguish user-authorized values from untrusted observations, effectively addressing the within-tool attack. Second, its deterministic fast path and capability-level runtime grants substantially reduce the frequency of expensive judge calls, improving runtime efficiency. On AgentDojo with Qwen3-max, ToolFence reduces overall ASR to near zero with only a 3.80 percentage-point clean-utility drop and practical runtime overhead.
Original source
This story was published by arXiv cs.AI and written by Yanjie Li, Xiangyu He, Xuelong Dai, Bin Xiao. SyncAI.news shows a preview; the complete article is on the publisher's site.
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