Why Backdooring Neural Networks is so Easy?

arXiv:2609.36117v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Securing modern AI systems against backdoor attacks remains an open challenge and requires fundamentally principled estimates of the adversary's budget -- the poison fraction $\pi$ and trigger strength $\alpha$ needed to construct successful yet stealthy attacks. Motivated by recent empirical evidence that poisoning large language models can require a nearly constant number of malicious samples even as clean datasets grow, we derive an exact closed-form analysis of a quadratic neuron trained on a poisoned Gaussian mixture. We show, perhaps counterintuitively, that the same feature-learning dynamics that make neural networks powerful can also make them more vulnerable to backdoors. Specifically, with clean accuracy preserved to first order, $O(\pi)$, we demonstrate that lazy learning imposes the inverse-square-root scaling $\alpha \propto \pi^{-1/2}$ for a successful attack, while feature learning induces a quadratic detector whose loss margin scales as $O(\alpha^4)$, improving the attack budget to $\alpha \propto \pi^{-1/4}$. Consequently, nonlinear feature learning substantially reduces the trigger strength required at small poison fractions, thereby in a sense making feature learners more backdoor vulnerable. These results provide a theoretical mechanism consistent with large-scale empirical observations and demonstrate that security audits based on linear heuristics can systematically underestimate backdoor vulnerability in the widely adopted feature-learning regimes.