Disrupting a covert Iranian influence operation

OpenAI is committed to preventing abuse and improving transparency around AI-generated content. This includes our work to detect and stop covert influence operations⁠ (IO), which try to manipulate public opinion or influence political outcomes while hiding the true identity or intentions of the actors behind them. This is especially important in the context of the many elections being held in 2024. We have expanded our work in this area throughout the year, including by leveraging our own AI models to better detect and understand abuse. 

This week we identified and took down a cluster of ChatGPT accounts that were generating content for a covert Iranian influence operation identified as Storm-2035⁠(opens in a new window). We have banned these accounts from using our services, and we continue to monitor for any further attempts to violate our policies. The operation used ChatGPT to generate content focused on a number of topics—including commentary on candidates on both sides in the U.S. presidential election – which it then shared via social media accounts and websites. 

Similar to the covert influence operations we reported in May⁠, this operation does not appear to have achieved meaningful audience engagement. The majority of social media posts that we identified received few or no likes, shares, or comments. We similarly did not find indications of the web articles being shared across social media. Using Brookings’ Breakout Scale⁠(opens in a new window), which assesses the impact of covert IO on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest), this operation was at the low end of Category 2 (activity on multiple platforms, but no evidence that real people picked up or widely shared their content). Our investigation benefited from information about the operation published by Microsoft last week.⁠(opens in a new window)