Evaluating System One Models for Agent Security Decisions: Reliability, Calibration, and Selective Automation

arXiv:2609.33401v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Agentic software connects language models to tools that modify files and interact with external services. Developers use model-based security checks to screen external content and user requests before agents act. System One models answer developer-defined questions with probabilities over predefined answers such as safe or unsafe, but classification accuracy alone does not establish whether these probabilities support reliable automation. We evaluate Jev, Laya, Decider, and Bespoke Nimble against specialized classifiers and language-model judges across prompt-injection detection, interaction-risk judgment, and harmful-request screening, examining decision accuracy, calibration, and selective automation. (1) High overall accuracy and low average calibration error can conceal attacks classified as safe with high confidence within particular groups. Developers should test candidate models on the intended security task and examine errors within relevant attack groups. (2) Policies selected under strict miss limits allow few test inputs automatically, and choosing allow and block thresholds separately increases automation mainly through additional blocks. Developers should verify limits on missed unsafe inputs and blocked benign inputs on independent data, and report the allowed and blocked fractions separately. (3) Comparing predictions on the same inputs shows that a language-model judge can detect unsafe inputs missed by a System One model, but can also repeat the System One model's confident mistakes and falsely flag benign inputs. Developers should test which missed unsafe inputs their review rule forwards, then measure the review model's misses and benign false alarms on those inputs.