Operation “Sneer Review”: China-origin influence activity

This case study was originally published in OpenAI’s June 2025⁠(opens in a new window) report.

Actor

We banned ChatGPT accounts that we detected using our models to bulk generate social media posts consistent with the activity of a covert influence operation. Over the course of our investigation, we also observed these accounts drafting internal performance reviews.

These accounts primarily issued prompts in Chinese and focused on political and geopolitical topics relevant to China. One user stated in a prompt that they worked for the Chinese Propaganda Department; however, we do not have independent evidence to verify this claim.

Behavior

The accounts that we banned engaged in two primary workstreams. The most prolific involved generating short social media comments in English and Chinese, with a few in Urdu. We identified many of these comments being posted on TikTok and X, with some additional content appearing on Reddit, Facebook, and various websites.

A typical pattern involved posting an initial comment from a “main” account, often apparently created solely for that post, followed by a series of reply comments from other accounts. This behavior appeared designed to create a false impression of organic engagement.

On TikTok, the commenting accounts used screen names in a variety of languages and alphabets, often unrelated to the language of the content they posted. For example, an account with a Korean name posted a comment in Urdu, while accounts with Thai and Hebrew names posted comments in English that were generated by this network. On X, commenting accounts typically used cartoon profile images and, in some cases, had names associated with cryptocurrency.

The network was less active on Facebook. Its activity primarily involved generating names and profile pictures for two Pages that posed as news outlets. Neither Page had any followers or likes, and each featured only a handful of posts.